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RECENT BOOKS
BOOK REVIEWS
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS. By Joseph
Parker Witherspoon. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1968.
Pp. viii, 581. $10.

Nearly three decades have passed since June 25, 1941, the birth
date of the administrative law of civil rights. On that day President
Roosevelt, by executive order, forbade discrimination on the basis
of race, creed, or national origin by federal agencies or by defense
industries, and established a Committee on Fair Employment Practice to implement his order.1 Since 1941 there has been a continuous
expansion of administrative activity in this area. We have now had
almost thirty years to observe the extension of coverage of civil
rights laws and the gradual development of more and more powerful enforcement devices. Provisions against discrimination have entered into the legal order at all levels--in federal law, in federal
administrative regulations, in the laws of thirty-seven states and
dozens of local communities, in scores of labor contracts, and in the
rules and regulations of a great variety of public and private institutions. Employment, education, public accommodations, and housing have come under the purview of the administrative law of civil
rights. As coverage has increased, so have the variety and strength of
formal administrative powers. Originally armed with only moral
force, agencies have gradually been granted both interlocutory and
permanent enforcement tools.
What are the lessons of these thirty years? Professor Witherspoon
seeks to summarize and capture them in a set of proposed model
statutes designed to embody both the proved features of past civil
rights law and remedies for known defects. Witherspoon understands that the principal weakness of most of the administrative activity of the past has been virtually exclusive reliance on the complaints of aggrieved individuals as the raw material for enforcement
programs. This strategy, which I have elsewhere christened the
"private-law approach" 2 fails to attack patterns of discrimination.
Rather, the energies of administrative agencies are dissipated in the
conciliation of an endless stream of relatively trivial incidents--arbitrations of misunderstandings, explanations of unintended sleights,
and routine surveillance of employment forms and applications.
These following provisions contain the thrust of Witherspoon's
legislative proposals:
1. Exec. Order No. 9,!!46, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Comp.).
2. L. MAYHEW, LAW 8e EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (1968).

[ 1441]

1442

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67

Section 502. Basic functions of the Commission. (a) The Commission shall perform the following basic functions:
(3) negotiating with governing bodies and agencies of political
subdivisions, with state agencies, and with persons and organizations
having statewide operations for the taking of action by them to improve opportunities available to minority and other disadvantaged
groups and utilizing of inspections, surveys, private conferences,
public hearings, reports, and enforcement actions to assure the
effectiveness of negotiation;
(4) processing individual complaints ...
(5) undertaking various types of constructive action designed to
eliminate the causes of intergroup-relations problems . . . that result from the continued existence of these problems . . . .
(b) It is the sense of the Legislature that the processing of individual complaints should be regulated as far as possible to local sections and that the negotiation and constructive-action functions of
the Commission should receive the greatest emphasis in its administration of the Act. [Pp. 315-16.J

It is my unhappy duty to report that Witherspoon's analysis is
both indubitably correct and profoundly shallow: correct because
he knows the weaknesses of the traditional approach and the appropriate direction of future movement, but shallow because he
does not systematically found his argument for change on a persuasive analysis of the failures of civil rights law in the social structure of American society and in the organization of community life.
In part, this weakness of Professor Witherspoon's work results from
limitations on his sources of data. He has read a large number of
statutes, annual reports of commissions, and secondary sources-the
kind of literature one can find in law libraries or receive in the
mail. That he accomplished anything with such materials is a
testimony to his insight and diligence because there is a noticeable
lack of trustworthy and substantial documentation in either the selfserving statements of administrative officials about their own work
or the pious pronunciamentos of liberals who do not want to believe
that thirty years' investment in the administrative implementation
of civil rights has come to nought, or at least to a dead end. All too
often he betrays the "biased sources of his work, to the detriment of
his own arguments. At one point he falls into the habit of the
annual-report writer and describes a "typical" case of alleged discrimination in employment: A qualified Negro electrician, who was
refused employment by a large electric company in Pittsburgh,
complained to the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.
Intensive investigation revealed discriminatory practices. The Commission corrected them and secured employment for the complainant (p. 112). Such an incident is not only atypical, it is extremely rare. My own research indicates that a case involving a
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complaint filed by a dismissed Negro elevator operator, who was
replaced by another Negro elevator operator in a building in which
all the elevator operators were Negro, is as "typical" as the usual
examples given in annual reports. To accept incorrectly the Pittsburgh Commission's designation of the typical case is to undermine
the author's own argument that complaints are not effective instruments of law enforcement. Similarly, although Witherspoon
recognizes that commissions do not receive many useful complaints
(pp. 158-59), he is willing to accept the common argument that the
dismissal of a high percentage of complaints betrays a weakness in
commission procedures (p. 177). The main reason for a high level
of dismissed complaints is that a large proportion are ill founded.
The dismissals do not mean that there is no discrimination, but they
do indicate that private complaints do not provide an effective
means of attacking it. More generally, in assessing performance,
Witherspoon does not hesitate to cite comparative statistics from
various administrative bodies despite the fact that the commissions
generally use unrevealing or deceptive categories of figures which
cannot be compared.
Similar caveats must be entered against Witherspoon's faith that
more aggressive policies of enforcement directed against patterns of
discrimination will be more successful. Here he relies on the reputation and. testimony of commissions that are known to have attempted strategic attacks on whole industries or spheres of employment. The New York State Commission is considered to be quite
vigorous and Witherspoon cites its experience as an example of the
relative success of militant enforcement, relying on its own reports
and a private study by Norgren and Hill3 (p. 119). However, confronted with adverse criticism of the New York Commission by
civil rights groups, he retreats and concludes that they have not
moved very far beyond the case method (p. 127). The Philadelphia
Commission emerges as an even greater hero, for it has in fact
engaged in a broad program of inspection, reporting, and negotiation on an industry-wide basis (pp. 202-05). He accepts its testimony
of its mvn success; to me it is self-serving. Neither the Philadelphia
Commission, nor any of the other supposedly aggressive commissions
-New York State, Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, New York City-have
been subjected to a rigorous, independent review by a professional
investigator. In the absence of an audit by a qualified expert who
has access to the record and to the industries in question, the verdict
should be that success has not been proved.
Conversely, the Massachusetts Commission emerges as a goat,
despite the fact that, were evidence of the quality adduced by Nor3. P.
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gren and Hill accepted, Massachusetts has a fine record.4 The
Massachusetts Commission is knmvn to be weak because it has been
subjected to close examination by an independent investigator; the
Massachusetts Governor's Commission had access to the report of
the examination and it, in turn, issued a report which was available
to Professor Witherspoon. 5
So far my criticism has been superficial; it relates to the quality
of the evidence and to the confused picture that necessarily emerges
when an investigator relies primarily on existing public documents.
The problems are deeper. In relying on such documents, one can
achieve no more than a rare glimpse of the social context in which
agencies operate or the hard social realities that they must face. If
the Philadelphia Commission has been more militant, what has
allowed the Commission to get away with it? If it has successfully
changed patterns of employment in whole industries, how, precisely,
did it accomplish that objective? From time to time Witherspoon
has glittering insights into the social character of discrimination, the
structured exclusion of minority groups from the mainstream of
community life, and the political difficulties of commissions, but he
does not thoroughly and consistently base his analysis on a solid
appreciation of those facts of life.
The fundamental obstacle to the elimination of discrimination
is de facto segregation in all its complicated, subtle, and unexpected
forms. Early in the history of the administrative implementation of
civil rights, the problem was seen as one of eliminating overt, deliberate policies of discrimination. That form has by no means been
destroyed, but there is growing recognition that even if racist exclusion is destroyed, the actual structure of minority group participation will not necessarily change. As long as patterns of housing
segregation exist, as long as there is segregation in voluntary associations, as long as minority groups are cut off from the networks of
communication in the community-in short, as long as segregation
remains in any area of life-it will be reproduced in other areas of
life, because the various spheres of human activity are linked to each
other, embedded in a common social structure. Witherspoon recognizes that patterns of de facto segregation require affirmative action
in order to change these social realities. However, he fails to follow
the logic of this position to its formidable conclusions. A unified
account of de facto segregation would appreciate that there is an
intimate affinity between de facto segregation and the failure of the
current policy of enforcing equality of opportunity through indi4. See, e.g., the statistics presented in MAsSACHUSETIS COMMISSION AGAINST DIS•
CRIMINATION, 1952 ANNUAL REPORT 9-10.
5. SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION To REVIEW THE FuNCTIONS AND POUCIES OF THE MAS•
SACHUSETIS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, REPORT (1964).
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vidual complaints. Both result from the same cause. Minority groups
are so excluded from the mainstream of participation in social life
that de facto segregation is everywhere-even, ironically, in the
patterns of complaints against discrimination. A passive approach to
the administrative implementation of civil rights has the same weakness as a passive approach to the elimination of discrimination
within any institution, be it a business firm, an educational facility,
or any other association. All require the same remedy, the active
construction of institutions of incorporation-institutions designed
to reach out and include minority groups in their activities.
Institutions of incorporation are more easily recommended than
constructed. Here Professor Witherspoon's plans are sketchy indeed.
He suggests that we could write a statute calling for a more active
approach, but he does not tell us how we could make it work. He
merely tells us that it has worked in Philadelphia. Perhaps it is
asking too much to demand practical advice from a book devoted
primarily to legal analysis; the technical side of negotiating change
is beyond the scope of purely legal problems. The flaw in that defense is that the two are not separable: purely legal problems may
pose the most serious obstacle to a more active approach. Is it possible that, having spent the better part of thirty years establishing
nondiscrimination clauses in the legal order at every level, we will
now find _that these clauses obstruct the attempt to include minority
groups in all phases of American life? There is a tension between
the idea of nondiscrimination, in the sense of passive color blindness, and active incorporation, in the sense of deliberately constructing avenues of access to opportunity. The latter implies not
color blindness but attention to color, even, in some cases, implicit
or explicit discrimination against majority groups. The tension leads
to legal problems which began to fester in the fifties when an agreement between Negro groups and New York breweries to increase
the employment of Negroes by working toward a quota of black
workers earned the displeasure of the state commission against discrimination. 6 Recently the federal Office of Education warned Antioch College that it must desegregate its black studies program or
face loss of federal funds. 7 More generally, many firms have used
state laws against discrimination as weapons against the presidential
equal opportunities programs that demand compliance reporting.
"How can we tell you how many minority group members we employ when state law tells us we must be color-blind?" Witherspoon's
model civil rights act would take care of this particular problem, but
not the generic problem as- it has become manifest in recent years.
6. STATE OF N.Y. INTERDEPARTMENAL
Low INCOMES (1959).
7. Z1 CoNG. Q. 367 (March 14, 1969).
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Indeed, if his proposed reforms are carried out, the latent tensions
in the two approaches will become progressively salient. Does Witherspoon's model act require the following amendment?
Nothing in this act may be construed to forbid the development or
implementation of any reasonable program designed to increase
economic and cultural opportunities for the members of any racial
or ethnic group that suffers from unreasonable deprivations of opportunity.
Would such an amendment be constitutional? At one point
Witherspoon does suggest a line of argument that might be used
to justify an explicit permissive clause of this sort. His proposed
statutes forbid not just discrimination but "certain unreasonable
practices and policies; including discrimination" (p. 308). At various
points discrimination is defined as direct or indirect exclusion.
Witherspoon apparently believes that the use of the broad concept
"unreasonable practice" would permit the expansion of laws against
discrimination to cover the variety of practices that in fact restrict
opportunity.
The principle to be established should be one prohibiting any
method of conducting a business, profession, or government agency
that unreasonably restricts a person of any race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or age in obtaining employment, housing, home
financing, public accommodations, education, or otherwise participating in any phases of community life. [P. 206.]
That is an interesting idea but is too limited. What would
Witherspoon's proposed statutes permit businesses, professions, and
government agencies to do? How far will it allow organizations to
go in establishing new forms of opportunity? That the problem
has not been seriously considered is clear from the fact that the
proposed new acts contain some inappropriate vestiges of the civil
rights laws of the past and present. Section 825 of the model state act
provides that it is unlawful for any employer prior to employment
to make inquiry concerning the race or ethnic origin of any applicant for employment. Such provisions are common in the present
civil rights laws, but how can an employer actively seek to employ
minority group members and still conform to this edict (p. 341)?
One of the proposed statutory definitions of discrimination,
despite its breadth (or perhaps because of it), raises many questions:
Section 701. Definitions. ...
(6) "Discrimination" means any direct or indirect exclusion, distinction, segregation, 'limitation, refusal, denial, or any other differentiation or preference in the treatment of a person or persons on
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account of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, age, sex,
or economic status .... [Pp. 323-24.]
Under that standard, would a training program designed to improve
opportunities for Negroes be a case of segregation? Would it indirectly discriminate against potential Caucasian trainees?
More aggressive enforcement of the traditional conceptions of
equal opportunity will not meet the new and emergent demands
of minority groups. And in a very profound sense, civil rights law
has always been oriented to trying to meet demands-to the reconciliation of groups. Discrimination has not been treated as a crime,
as a violation of the moral order; past civil rights laws have contained penalties not for violating the law but for violating the orders
of civil rights commissions. It is as if a victim of robbery could do
no more than file a complaint with an antirobbery commission.
The commission would then conciliate the claim, attempt to achieve
reparations, and order the robber to cease his life of crime. Only
after violating the cease-and-desist order could the robber be subject
to criminal sanctions. Witherspoon retains this conception of discrimination in his proposed legislation.
Civil rights law has to a large extent been patterned on labor
law, specifically the National Labor Relations Act. The emphasis is
on negotiation, conciliation, and standards of fairness. If this is to be
the approach, then it would seem that the law must recognize and
cope with the actual character of the demands that are being pressed.
Members of the new generation of blacks do not want their blackness
denied; for them, to be treated universalistically is to be denied
identity, and, more important, to be denied power. They do not
want color-blind treatment, they want a piece of the action. Witherspoon fails to appreciate the significance of this movement from
color blindness to color consciousness.
Finally, I should enter a word on Witherspoon's faith in localism in the implementation of civil rights (pp. 215-87). A great deal
of Witherspoon's most detailed analysis concerns problems in the
Southwest (Austin, Texas, in particular). As to conditions and forecasts for this region I bow to Professor Witherspoon's superior expertise. At the same time, I cannot accept on faith his basic premise
that legal action in the local community provides a superior vantage
point for attacking problems of discrimination. It is true that one
can argue sociologically that the production of change requires action at the grass roots. But one can also argue that it is local politics
which is most thoroughly controlled by the least responsible interests in our political system, and that a locally based commission is
the most corruptible. Witherspoon argues that the greater militancy
of such local commissions as those in New York City, Philadelphia,
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Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Detroit is a result of the fact that they are
locally based. I would argue that local commissions are more aggressive because they entered the arena at a later point in time.
The pioneering action took place at the state level, but the state
commissions were initially interested in achieving recognition of
their legitimacy, and thus they became circumscribed by relatively
conservative enforcement policies. Local commissions moved into
the political niche created by the rise of support for militant action
because the state commissions were unable to transcend their history.
Witherspoon's arguments as to what would constitute constructive
action at the local level are excellent, but again he has failed to
ground his general analysis on persuasive appeals to the facts of the
social order-in this case the facts of power.
Professor Witherspoon's work is well worth careful study. His
proposed statutes should be examined by all legislators and groups
who seek to improve civil rights legislation. That his work and his
proposals can be seriously questioned is merely an inescapable consequence of the tempo of social change. In intellectual activity we
must stop from time to time to sort out our impressions and to devise new schemes to account for new facts. While we stop to think,
the realities of the social environment move on.

Leon Mayhew,
Associate Professor
of Sociology,
University of Michigan

